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LEGAL DETERMINACY AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION

JODY S. KRAUS*

INTRODUCTION
Since this is a conference on law and morality, and the topic of
this panel is theories of contract law, I thought it particularly
appropriate to ask how a theory of contract law can provide a moral
justification for contract law. That question can be answered only
by providing a more general account of how a legal theory can
provide a moral justification for any area of the private law. In this
preliminary Essay, I argue that in order morally to justify the
private law, a theory of the private law must derive reasons from a
normative political theory that determine the outcomes of adjudication in cases within the private law.1 I reject the claim that legal
theories can provide a moral justification merely by demonstrating
a correspondence or coherence between a normative political theory
and the doctrinal statements found in cases, treatises, restatements, and the like, leaving the question of whether and how those
doctrines determine outcomes unanswered. In short, my claim is
that moral justification requires legal determinacy.2 At the outset,
* Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy,
University of Virginia. The author thanks Steven D. Walt for very helpful comments and
the William and Mary Law Review for its editorial assistance.
1. I take no position on the question of whether normative political theories can or must
derive their justifications of state coercion from a general moral theory (as, for example,
classical utilitarianism maintains), or whether they must instead derive them from a
normative theory that is independent of any comprehensive moral theory (as, for example,
Rawls’s political liberalism maintains). Througout this Essay, I use the term “moral
justification” loosely to refer to both kinds of justification.
2. This claim builds on an argument I advance elsewhere that explanatory legal theories
are subject to a more modest version of the determinacy criterion that prefers more
determinate to less determinate explanations. See Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and
Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory
Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2007).
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let me be clear that I am not talking about causal determinacy.
Rather, the claim is one about justification: an area of law cannot
be justified unless it provides reasons that epistemically warrant
the conclusion that its adjudicatory outcomes are uniquely justified.
After developing the argument for this view, I conclude by considering three of its implications of this view. The first is that theories
that purport to provide a moral justificant of any area of law must
proceed by first explaining how the law in that area determines
adjudicative outcomes. Explanatory theories of the private law are
therefore methodologically prior to the moral justification of the
private law. The second is that John Rawls’s theory of public
justification in Political Liberalism3 requires normative theories of
the private law to identify the content of the private law with the
express judicial reasoning in decisions governed by the private law.
Therefore, if that reasoning cannot be interpreted as providing
reasons that determine the outcomes of private law adjudication,
then the private law is not morally justified. A third implication is
that whether the private law can be justified ultimately will depend
on what jurisprudential theory of law turns out to be correct. Those
that share Rawls’s commitment to treating express judicial
reasoning as constitutive of the law, for the same or different
reasons, will have to interpret that language to make it outcomedeterminative in order to justify the private law. Jurisprudential
views that treat express judicial reasoning as mere theories of the
law that are not constitutive of law will have a better prospect of
demonstrating the determinacy of the reasoning in the private law.
I. THE ARGUMENT FOR LEGAL DETERMINACY
Let us begin by asking what a normative theory must demonstrate in order to provide a moral justification of the private law. At
a minimum, it must demonstrate that the exercise of state coercion
to enforce the outcomes of common law adjudication is justified.
Rather than justifying the diffuse threat of coercion underlying
political society generally, an adjudicative outcome produces a
judicial order backed by the threat of state coercion directed
3. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212-54 (1993).
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specifically at an individual litigant. The need for the justification
of the coercion exercised on behalf of an adjudicative outcome is
therefore especially acute. Thus, if a normative theory of the private
law cannot provide an adequate justification of outcomes of private
law adjudication, it fails in its essential purpose.
Normative theories of the private law, however, often take the
moral justification of the private law to consist in the endorsement
of a defensible normative theory combined with a demonstration
that the rough outlines of, for example, contract or tort law, would
be justified by that theory. Consider corrective justice theorists,
who provide a normative justification of contract or tort law by
demonstrating how the structure of adjudication in contract and
tort, as well as the abstract content of the pre-theoretically defined
“core” doctrines, cohere with the requirements of corrective justice.4
Yet they fail to explain how those doctrines determine outcomes
particularly in hard cases. I have argued elsewhere that the surface
meaning of the language of private law doctrine is often too vague
to be of use to determine the outcomes of adjudication in hard
cases.5 At best, the language of those doctrines determines a set of
reasons judges may not use to decide the outcome of their cases.
But it fails to direct or constrain the judicial choice among the
reasons not prohibited by the doctrinal surface language, even
though those reasons can support an outcome in favor of either
litigant.6 For this reason, the corrective justice justifications are
inadequate: they fail to provide justifying reasons that explain why
the losing party lost.7 My claim, then, is that the justification of the
private law requires an argument based on a normative political
theory demonstrating that the outcomes of private law adjudication
are justified. And further, I maintain that these outcomes cannot be
justified by anything short of justifying reasons that determine
them. Normative theories that do not provide determinative
justifying reasons are to that extent defective. Though they may be

4. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 24.
5. See Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The
Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420, 431-36 (2001).
6. See id.
7. Id.
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of use to constrain judicial decisions, they nonetheless fail to
provide sufficient guidance to determine and thereby justify them.
In response, moral philosophers familiar with Robert Nozick’s
discussion of moral theory might argue that this conception of
justification misconceives the role of normative theory in regulating
human conduct. Nozick conceives of morality as providing what he
calls “side constraints” only: that is, restrictions prohibiting interference with the liberty of others without their consent.8 American
employment law illustrates side constraints. Private employers are
free to fire “at will” employees for no reason whatsoever or for any
reason other than a discriminatory one.9 Employment discrimination law only imposes limits on employer firing decisions, leaving
them unfettered discretion within the bounds of those constraints.
Rawls’s claim that the principles of justice apply only to the basic
structure of society provides a possible example of a normative
political theory that sets side constraints only: it appears to render
the theory of justice agnostic about the normative principles
governing choice among non-basic structures.10 Of course, one could
accept the claim that the principles of justice should apply only to
the basic structure of society, but still insist that a complete theory
of justice must supply additional principles to assess the justness
of society’s non-basic structures as well. Rawls’s position on the
justice of non-basic structures is not clear.
The conception of morality as providing only side constraints is
a definitive feature of many deontic theories. It finds its most
philosophically profound and influential expression in the deontic
credo that the Right is prior to the Good.11 By defining the Right
independently of the Good, deontic theory leaves individuals free to
pursue their own conceptions of the Good as long as they do not
violate the rights of others to do the same.12 Individual conduct
8. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-35 (1974).
9. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.27 (3d ed. 2005).
10. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 10-12 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7-11 (1971); John Rawls, The Basic Structure as Subject,
14 AM. PHIL. Q. 159 (1977).
11. WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 21-40 (1989); RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 31; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS
OF JUSTICE 2-7 (1982).
12. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 31.
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within the set of deontically permissible activities is left to the
unfettered discretion of the individual.13 Theories of the Good can
offer guidance on the virtues of different conceptions of the Good,
but morality leaves individuals free to choose among those conceptions.14 Given this view of morality, it is tempting to claim that
normative political theory only limits the exercise of state coercion.
Like the individual, the state may exercise unfettered discretion in
choosing among the various actions it might take so long as it does
not act for an impermissible reason. Although the state’s actions
might be subject to evaluation under a theory of the good, it
nonetheless has the right to act as it pleases within the constraints
provided by normative political theory.
The view that normative political theory provides only side
constraints on state action is, however, deeply mistaken. It is based
on a false analogy between the individual and the state. Individuals
have independent rights. As moral philosophers sometimes put the
point, they are self-originating sources of valid moral claims.15
States are not. The phrase “state rights” in moral theory is merely
a figure of speech; state rights are entirely derivative of individual
rights.16 The state has no claim in its own right. Every state action,
by definition, constitutes an exercise of coercion. Unlike individuals
operating within the confines of deontic constraints, the state—
without exception—requires an affirmative justification for all of its
actions. Normative theories that fail to demonstrate that particular
state actions are supported by justifying reasons that determine
those actions thus fail to justify. Political justification cannot
remain aloof, approving abstract concepts and institutional frameworks while remaining neutral on the details. In political philosophy, as elsewhere, the devil is the details. And that is precisely the
perspective of the litigant who finds to her dismay that the judge
ruled against her based on the details of the facts of her case and
the doctrines of the private law. If the doctrines are not justified by
13. See id.
14. See id. at 30-31.
15. See, e.g., John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 546
(1980).
16. For a brief discussion of the relationship between the individual and the state, see
KYMLICKA, supra note 11, at 24.
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a normative political theory, or the doctrines are justified but do not
determine the outcome, then the justification for the coercive
enforcement of the judgment is quite literally lost in the details.
Political justification must start at the top and go all the way down.
That means that normative theories of the private law must provide
affirmative reasons that justify the outcomes of private law
adjudication, not merely endorse the idea of the private law without
weighing in on how judges do or should decide cases. Normative
legal theory is applied political philosophy, but it is all or nothing.
There is no going half way.
One might object that we may have no choice but to go half way.
The best normative legal theory may be indeterminate. Its justification might be based on concepts or terms that are ineliminably
vague or indeterminate, or it might require trade-offs and balancing
between competing values but lack a meta-principle to assign
weights to competing values and to define what constitutes a proper
balance of values. This indeterminacy constitutes an inherent
limitation on the justificatory force of the theory and renders it
vulnerable to an equally plausible but more determinate normative
theory. But assuming there is no such competitor, the best normative theory may lack the capacity to determine the justification of
some acts of state coercion. We might therefore conclude that,
although state actions falling within the indeterminate range of the
normative theory cannot be given a full justification, they have been
given a partial justification—one that demonstrates that those
actions are not prohibited by the justificatory theory—and that
partial justification is all that individuals can demand of the state
under those circumstances.
This seems to be the view that Rawls embraces in A Theory of
Justice.17 According to Rawls, the test for determining the precise
form just institutions must take is given by the outcomes of
idealized constitutional conventions and legislatures:
This test is often indeterminate: it is not always clear which of
several constitutions, or economic and social arrangements,
would be chosen. But when this is so, justice is to that extent
likewise indeterminate. Institutions within the permitted range
17. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 10.
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are equally just, meaning that they could be chosen; they are
compatible with all the constraints of the theory.... This indeterminacy in the theory of justice is not in itself a defect. It is what
we should expect. Justice as fairness will prove a worthwhile
theory if it defines the range of justice more in accordance with
our considered judgments than do existing theories, and if it
singles out with greater sharpness the graver wrongs a society
should avoid.18

Rawls is surely correct that indeterminacy constitutes an unavoidable fact of life that does not undermine the force of the determinate results of a normative political theory such as justice as
fairness. But it is a nonsequitur to conclude, as Rawls does, that
when indeterminacy does obtain, “[i]nstitutions within the permitted range are equally just.”19 If institutions fall within the indeterminate range of the theory of justice, then the theory provides no
reason for concluding either that those institutions are just or
unjust. An indeterminate answer is no answer at all. Rather than
concluding such institutions are equally just, we can conclude only
that their justness, under that theory, is equally indeterminate.
Perhaps a better argument for settling for partial justifications
under conditions of irreducible indeterminacy is that the state in
some instances simply cannot fail to act. When the state is compelled by sufficient moral reason to take action but lacks a determinate reason for choosing among all the possible alternative actions
it could take, we might think that the moral maxim “ought implies
can” should apply to states as well. We might concede that when
states have good moral reason to act, but lack justifying reasons
that determine their choice among the possible actions that are not
prohibited by the correct normative political theory, they are, like
the employer of an “at will” employee, free to choose among those
alternatives for any non-prohibited reason or no reason at all.
Consider a state that has good moral reason to construct roads but
has no good moral reason for choosing whether to require drivers to
drive on the right or on the left. To ensure the question of justice is
engaged, suppose that some individuals rank the two possibilities
differently. Surely the indeterminacy of the available justifying
18. Id. at 201.
19. Id.
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reasons for making this choice cannot entail that the state is not
justified in making the choice anyway. Perhaps the presence of good
moral reason to act under conditions of indeterminacy provides the
only defensible instance in which political philosophy is properly
regarded as providing side constraints only.
But even this reasoning is misleading. When a state has good
moral reason to act, but lacks a reason for acting in a particular
way, its good moral reason for taking action gives the state
sufficient reason to choose a second-order decision procedure for
selecting a particular action to take. It might appear that the state
is still left to exercise its discretion in choosing among possible
second-order decision procedures that do not select actions based on
impermissible reasons. But since the occasion for invoking such a
procedure will always be the lack of affirmative reasons that justify
a particular action, only a random decision procedure would qualify.
For justificatory purposes, there is no difference between random
decision procedures. Thus, the action selected by a state under
conditions of indeterminacy will be fully determined by justifying
reasons. It will be determined by the combination of the first-order
reasons that ruled out any actions affirmatively prohibited by the
normative political theory, and the second-order random decision
procedure that is justified by whatever good reasons the state had
for taking some action or other in the first place, such as the
welfare enhancement of its citizens that will result from building
roads and having a rule about which side to drive on. In cases of
genuine indeterminacy of justifying reasons, any random decision
procedure qualifies. There is, by hypothesis, no justification for
using democratic decision procedures to decide what action the
state should take. If democratic decision procedures were justified
by the correct normative political theory, then the democratic
majority preferences would supply the determinate reason for
preferring one course of action over the others.
The claim that the state must have justifying reasons that
determine all state actions may appear wildly impractical. Indeed,
if the “ought implies can” principle applies to states at all, surely,
one might argue, it would relieve states of such an onerous
requirement on the ground that complying with it would be utterly
disabling. No state could satisfy it. I want to resist this claim as
well. Its plausibility stems from the implicit assumption that every
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state actor would have to justify every possible decision every day.
It also supposes that the justification of discrete actions is extraordinarily complex, even if the normative standard for justified action
is clear. Moreover, if the standard itself is not clear, then every
state official would appear to be required to earn a Ph.D. in political
philosophy, and another Ph.D. in institutional design and decision
making. Even then, they would spend their entire official lives
analyzing the possible justifications for their actions and would
never get around to taking action. State actors, and therefore the
state, would be disabled.
Let us call this the “impracticality objection” to the determinacy
criterion for justification that I have been urging. My response to it
relies on Gerald Gaus’s distinction between inconclusive and
indeterminate reasoning. According to Gaus,
[t]he justification for accepting (or rejecting) a belief is inconclusive if the justification meets the minimum standard of proof for
acceptance (rejection) but falls short of some high standard of
proof for conclusiveness, certainty, knowledge, and so on. A
justification for accepting (or rejecting) a belief is indeterminate
if it falls short of the minimum degree of proof required for
either justified acceptance or rejection.20

Thus, Gaus takes indeterminacy of reasons to occur when “the
system of beliefs does not determine a response to [a particular
proposition] because neither its acceptance nor rejection can be
justified.”21 Indeterminate reasoning, therefore, cannot produce a
result no matter how much intelligence and energy is brought to
bear on it. When reasons are indeterminate, the correct answer is
that the reasons do not provide an answer. Note that when officials
know that justifying reasons are indeterminate, the demands of
justification are easily met. If the state lacks good moral reason
for acting at all, then it should not act. If the state has good
moral reason for acting, but lacks determinate justifying reasons
for choosing among the particular actions it could take, then
the state must use a random decision procedure (assuming the
affected individuals are not indifferent among the possible actions).
20. GERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM 153 (1996).
21. Id.
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Inconclusive reasons, however, are not indeterminate.22 Inconclusive reasoning yields a determinate result, but that result might be
wrong.23 The available justifying reasons might in fact determine
what action is justified if the necessary time, energy, and intelligence could be brought to bear on them. Yet it does not follow that
a belief about the justified actions must be based on conclusive
reasoning about what that action is. So long as the state’s inconclusive reasoning yields a determinate answer, that is enough to
satisfy the determinacy requirement.
I therefore maintain, with Gaus, that state coercion is justified
if it is supported by inconclusive but determinate reasoning that
meets a threshold of epistemic responsibility. So long as the state
acts on the basis of inconclusive but determinate reasoning that
justifies its belief that its action is justified, the state has discharged its justificatory burden. That means that even if correct
reasoning demonstrates that the state lacks a justification for
acting because the available justifying reasons are in fact indeterminate, the state nonetheless would be justified if it acts on the
basis of inconclusive, justified, yet erroneous reasoning. Thus, legal
justification does not require that the correct justifying reasoning
yield a determinate result. Instead, even if the correct justifying
reasons are indeterminate, the state acts with justification provided
it acts on the basis of epistemically justified, inconclusive, but
determinate justifying reasons. On this view, should that reasoning
later be refuted, the state’s decision would have to be reversed if
possible, but individuals harmed by the mistake would have no
claim against the state. In that event, the state would have acted
on the basis of responsible justificatory reasoning and that is all
that can be required of it. Even though the correct normative
political theory, in principle, prohibits a particular state action,
either because it provides a determinate answer prohibiting that
action or provides no determinate answer and therefore cannot
justify that action, the state nonetheless can be justified in acting
on the basis of inconclusive but determinate justificatory reasoning.
The important point here, for present purposes, is that the state
is never justified in acting in the absence of justifying reasons that
22. Id. at 152-53.
23. See id. at 154.
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determine its actions. In the event its first-order justifying reasons
are indeterminate, it can act only if there is a justifying reason to
act in the absence of first-order reasons that select a particular
action. In that event, it will use a random decision procedure to
select the action it will take. If there are reasons that determine
whether a given state action is justified, but the state cannot
reasonably determine what those reasons are, it acts justifiably
when its inconclusive reasoning meets a threshold of epistemic
responsibility and determines the action it should take. In all cases,
then, that state is justified in acting only on the basis of justifying
reasons that conclusively or inconclusively determine the actions it
takes. The state is therefore never at liberty to exercise discretion
in choosing among possible state actions. But contrary to the
impracticability objection, the state can justify its decisions without
undertaking relentless and debilitating Herculean analyses. All it
must do is act in an epistemically responsible manner. That means
that it can act on the basis of inconclusive but determinate reasons,
which might include reasons that justify it acting according to preestablished routines, rules, principles, or procedures that obviate
the need to undertake constant and de novo analyses. We can, then,
insist that the state act only on the basis of justifying reasons that
determinate its actions without insisting that those reasons
correctly determine whether the state action is justified. The state
can be justified (epistemically) in choosing an action that turns out
to have been unjustified. So long as we allow that the determinacy
criterion can be satisfied by inconclusive (and therefore possibly
erroneous) reasoning, the determinacy criterion no longer threatens
to impose an impossible burden on the state.
We have come some way from the theory of the private law, to
which I would like now to return. My claim is that a theory can
justify the private law only by adducing justifying reasons that
determine the outcomes of private law adjudication. The deontic
theories of contract and tort purport to justify those bodies of
law by establishing the normative credentials of the reasoning
evidenced in the express explanatory language of judicial opinions,
treatises, and restatements.24 At the same time, they often
24. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 1-64 (2001); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
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acknowledge that this language is insufficient to determine which
litigant should win in the cases decided under these doctrines.25 I
maintain that doctrinal statements that do not determine outcomes
are not the proper object of justification. Ultimately, it is judicial
outcomes and not doctrinal statements that stand in need of
justification. Establishing the normative credentials of express
judicial reasoning in the private law serves to justify the private
law only if that reasoning in fact determines the results of private
law adjudication. Any theory that falls short of identifying justifying reasons that determine the outcomes of private law adjudication
fails to justify the private law.
II. THREE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DETERMINACY REQUIREMENT
Although there are many implications of the claim that the
justification of the private law requires justifying reasons that
determine outcomes in private law adjudication, I want here to
focus on just three. The first is that normative theories of the
private law cannot avoid the jurisprudential labor of first constructing an explanatory theory of the private law: a theory that explains
the reasons that determine private law outcomes. The only way to
justify the outcomes of private law adjudication is to demonstrate
that the reasons that determine them justify state coercion
according to the correct normative political theory. The reasons that
determine private law outcomes must be identified by a theory. If
the express doctrinal justifications for outcomes do not suffice to
determine outcomes, then some jurisprudential theory is needed to
explain the reasons that do determine them. If the best jurisprudential theory concludes that the private law in fact does not
provide reasons that determine adjudicative outcomes, the determinacy requirement holds that the private law cannot be justified. At
a minimum, the private law can be justified only if the outcomes of
private law adjudication are determined by reason. Only then can

PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981); STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT
THEORY 24-32 (2004); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995); Peter Benson,
The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118, 118-205 (Peter Benson
ed., 2001).
25. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 24, at 26-27.
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we ask if those reasons constitute justifying reasons according to
the correct normative political theory.
The second implication of the determinacy requirement is that
the private law can be justified according to the theory of political
justification in Rawls’s Political Liberalism only if the express
judicial reasoning in private law adjudication can be given an
interpretation that renders it outcome-determinative. Recall that,
on Rawls’s view, state coercion can be justified only by public
reasons, and those reasons must be made public.26 Under political
liberalism’s publicity requirement, it is not enough that public
reasons justifying state coercion merely exist even if they are not
made public.27 Individuals charged with responsibility for choosing
state action must publicly offer public reasons to justify their
choices.28 Adjudication is the paradigm instance in which state
action requires such public justification.29 So Rawls’s political
theory could not provide a justification of the private law without
demonstrating that the express judicial reasoning in the private law
provides sufficient public reason to justify the outcomes of private
law adjudication. There is no room in Rawls’s theory for a jurisprudential view that does not identify the private law with the express
judicial reasoning in private law cases. If those reasons, properly
understood, do not justify private law decisions, then for Rawls,
private law decisions are not justified. Given the determinacy
criterion I have defended,30 if the public reasons judges provide in
their express reasoning fail to determine the results of private law
adjudication, the coercion exercised in accordance with that
adjudication is not justified.
A final implication is that whether the private law provides
determinate reasons for the outcomes of adjudication, and is
therefore capable of justification, depends importantly on the
jurisprudential view the private law theorist endorses. Rawls’s
political theory of justification, it turns out, has the interesting
jurisprudential implication that the common law consists in the
public reasons, suitably theorized, that judges offer on its behalf.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

RAWLS, supra note 3, at 212-54.
See id. at 66-71.
See id.
See id. at 215-16.
See supra note 2 and source cited therein.
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Rawls appears to be committed to treating those reasons as
constitutive of the law that decides a case. Similarly, Ronald
Dworkin’s jurisprudential theory holds that the law consists in the
best interpretation of preinterpretive legal facts and appears to
treat the express reasoning in judicial decisions as preinterpretive
legal facts.31 I have argued elsewhere, however, that the historical
legal figures who championed the classical theory of the common
law of contract, including Langdell, Holmes, and Williston, clearly
viewed the express reasoning in common law opinions merely as
fallible and often erroneous theories of the common law, rather
than pre-theoretical data constitutive of the common law.32 For
them, the common law outcomes were the only data that needed to
be explained. I have also argued that the contemporary economic
analysis of law subscribes to this same view. On this concededly
under-developed jurisprudential view, the prospects for explaining
the private law as consisting in reasons that determine outcomes in
adjudication are far better.
CONCLUSION
The idea that legal theories seek not only to explain but to
evaluate the moral justification of particular areas of law is quite
familiar. Yet little attention has been paid to the minimal criteria
of adequacy for justificatory legal theories. Whereas many theories
claim to identify the moral grounds that justify a particular area of
law, such as contracts or torts, none of them explains how its
justification determines the outcomes of adjudication governed by
the law in that area. In this brief Essay, I have argued that a
particular area of law can be justified only by identifying moral
reasons that fully determine the results of adjudication. No matter
how compelling the moral reasons a legal theory identifies, and how
tight the fit between those reasons and the structure and content
of the legal rules governing a judicial decision, a legal theory fails
to justify a particular area of law if the reasoning it identifies falls
short of fully determining the results in the judicial decisions
31. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 65-68 (1986).
32. See Jody S. Kraus, The Jurisprudential Origins of Contemporary Contract Theory
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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governed by that law. Though this bold claim may seem unrealistic,
I have argued that legal theories can satisfy this determinacy
requirement by identifying determinate but inconclusive reasoning
that explains outcomes in adjudication. While such reasoning may
prove to be erroneous, that does not undermine its justificatory
force.
Perhaps the most important implication of the determinacy
criterion for justificatory legal theories is that the tasks of explaining and justifying a particular body of law cannot be regarded as
analytically independent. Instead, theories seeking to justify a
particular area of law must first explain the reasons that determine
the outcomes of adjudication in that area of law and then explain
why those reasons have justificatory force. In addition, legal
theories must at least implicitly take a position on the jurisprudential question of whether the law consists in the express or implied
reasoning judges use in deciding cases, or the best theory of the
outcomes of adjudication irrespective of the correspondence between
that theory and the reasoning used by the judges who decide the
cases. Those theories, such as Rawls’s Political Liberalism, already
committed to the view that only public reasons can justify the
exercise of political coercion, will have to demonstrate that the
public reasons judges invoke actually determine the outcomes in
adjudication. Other theorists, such as the classical contract scholars
and contemporary economic analysts of law, might need only to
identify morally justifying reasons that determine the outcomes of
adjudication, even if those reasons do not correspond to the reasons
the judges actually used to reach those outcomes. The determinacy
criterion, therefore, requires legal theorists to uncover the jurisprudential foundations of their theories before advancing explanatory
or normative claims on their behalf. That is the task of the next
generation of legal theorists of the private law.

